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and on the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. Colbert, 593 A.2d at 228 
(quoting Buzbee v. Journal Newspa-
per, 465 A.2d 426 (Md. 1983». The 
court further stated that the function of 
the judicial process is influenced by 
public access. Id. The court observed 
that access to pretrial proceedings 
allows the public to "evaluate the 
work of trial judges, prosecutors and 
public defenders in the criminal jus-
tice system." Id. 
The court, nevertheless, recog-
nized that the right of access to pretrial 
proceedings is not absolute. Id. The 
court emphasized that there are lim-
ited circumstances where a defendant's 
right to a fair trial outweigh the con-
stitutional presumption of openness. 
Id. The court reasoned that closure 
should be considered on a case-by-
case basis and the public should be 
given an opportunity to question their 
exclusion. Id. The court further 
determined that a motion for closure 
should be docketed prior to the hear-
ing to provide adequate notice to op-
pose the motion. Id. at229. Thecourt 
stated that in situations where advance 
notice is impracticable, any individu-
als in the courtroom should be given a 
reasonable opportunity to oppose the 
closure. Id. 
In the present case, the trial court 
ruled on the closure motion before 
arguments in opposition were heard. 
Id; As a result, the court of appeals 
determined that notice and reasonable 
opportunity to oppose the closure were 
not provided, thus violating the public's 
and the media's constitutional rights. 
Id. 
The court reasoned that the party 
seeking closure must persuade the 
court that their rights will be infringed 
upon by an open hearing, and that 
there are no reasonable alternatives to 
closure. Id. Additionally, the court 
emphasized that when a defendant 
asks for closure under the Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, the 
specific findings by the court must be 
made on the record. Id. at230. Under 
this fair trial argument, the trial court 
should consider the extent of publicity 
the case has and will receive after a 
public hearing. Id. In addition, the 
trial court must specifically determine 
that closure is the only reasonable way 
to protect the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. Id. The court further added 
that if there are any alternatives to 
closure which will protect the 
defendant's rights, these alternatives 
must be employed prior to closure. 
Id. 
The court next addressed an inher-
ent problem at the hearing of a motion 
to close. The court considered the 
situation arising when the moving 
party informs the court of the reasons 
to close and the sensitive nature of the 
information sought to be protected has 
necessarily been revealed. To avoid 
this problem, the court reasoned that 
the trial court must receive sensitive 
evidence in private, but on the record. 
Id. Further, the court agreed that the 
sensitive portions of the record may be 
sealed but only as long as reasonably 
necessary. Id. 
Because in the present case the 
trial court granted the motion to close 
before making the required specific 
findings, the court determined that the 
trial court's statement that Colbert 
could only be afforded a fair trial by 
closure was not supported by any 
facts. Id. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in closing the hearing and seal-
ing all portions of the record. The 
court opined that the trial judge could 
have heard the sensitive evidence in 
private and sealed only that part pro-
tecting the public's right of access to 
therecords. Id. When sealing records, 
the court explained that the closure 
must be narrowly tailored and that the 
interests protected must be articulated 
and supported by specific findings. 
Id. 
In reaching its conclusion, the 
court of appeals balanced First Amend-
ment rights of public access in crimi-
nal cases against the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights to a fair trial. As 
a result, the public will be excluded 
only when the defendant's right to a 
fair trial cannot be protected. How-
ever, the burden on trial judges is now 
heavier both in giving the media an 
opportUnity to be heard prior to clo-
sure and in specifically articulating 
the grounds for closure. Also on a 
broader scale, the opinion has rein-
forced the right of media access to 
criminal trials as guaranteed by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
- Bruce D. Hechmer 
Federated Department Stores v. Le: 
EMPLOYER POTENTIALLY 
LIABLE TO ITS EMPWYEEFOR 
TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF A 
CO-EMPWYEE. 
In Federated Department Stores v. 
Le, 595 A.2d 1067 (Md. 1991), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that the Maryland Workers' Compen-
sation Act permits employees to sue 
employers under common law in cases 
where an employee deliberately in-
jures a co-employee. In so holding, 
the court expanded the liability of 
Maryland employers for injuries to 
their employees. 
Federated Department Stores, do-
ing business as Bloomingdales, em-
ployed Thach Le as a salesperson. On 
the morning of April 11, 1983, he left 
his briefcase in an employee store-
room. Upon his return to the store-
room, he was asked to accompany a 
security guard to the security office. 
The Regional Director of Security, 
Suzanne Spahr, was there waiting for 
Le. Spahr accused Le of attempting to 
steal a calculator which was in his 
briefcase. Although he denied the 
allegation, Le claims that Spahr forced 
him to sign a prepared confession 
before she would allow him to leave 
the room. Federated terminated Le 
shortl y thereafter. Le asserted that he 
later learned that Mrs. Spahr had 
framed him. Le sued Federated De-
partment Stores for damages, charg-
ing Federated with false arrest, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, 
and defamation. 
Federated filed a motion for sum-
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mary judgment claiming that the ex-
clusivity provision ofsection 15 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act barred 
Le's action. Section 15 states in 
pertinent part that «an employer's 
I iabil ity for payment of workers' com-
pensation provided for in this statute 
shall be the exclusive remedy." Id. at 
1069. Federated additionally argued 
that although section 44 of the Mary-
land Workers' Compensation Act pro-
vides an exception to the exclusivity 
rule by permitting common law ac-
tions against employers for deliberate 
torts, it did not apply to Le. Id. 
Federated cited Maryland case law for 
the proposition that an employee could 
sue only if the potential tort-feasor 
was the employer's «alter ego" or 
acted with its express authorization. 
Id. at 1 070 (citing Continental Casu-
alty Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). Feder-
ated argued that because Spahr was 
not its " alter ego," nor acting with its 
express authority, Le's only redress 
was governed by the terms of the Act. 
Accepting this interpretation, the cir-
cuit court granted Federated's mo-
tion. 
The court of special appeals re-
versed, stating that because Le's case 
involved non-physical injuries, it did 
not fall within the provision of the 
Workers Compensation Act. Id. The 
intermediate appellate court distin-
guished Le's case from earlier cases 
on the ground that the latter dealt with 
physical injuries while Le's injuries 
were non-physical, thereby allowing 
Le's action to proceed. Id. Federated 
appealed to the court of appeals which 
affirmed the intermediate court's de-
cision on different grounds. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by interpreting the appropri-
ate sections of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Id. at 1071. The court first 
reiterated the basic principal that sec-
tion 44 operates as an exception to the 
exclusivity requirement of section 15 
and provides that an employee shall 
have the " option to take benefits under 
article or sue where injury or death 
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results from the deliberate intention of Alexander & Alexander v. Evander & 
employer. " Id. (quoting Md. Ann. Assoc. , Inc.: COURT OF SPECIAL 
Code art. 101 § 44 (1985 & 1990 APPEALS VACATES STATE'S 
Supp.)). The court held that the prior LARGEST PUNITIVE AWARD. 
decisions of the court of special ap- Acting in accordance with a recent 
peals construed the section too nar- United States Supreme Court opinion, 
rowly by requiring that the tort-feasor the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
be the employer's « alter ego" or act land recognized in Alexander & 
with its express authority. Id. at 1072. Alexander v. Evander & Assoc. , Inc. " 
The court of appeals declined to 596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
adopt the " alter ego" test and allowed 1991), an opportunity to review 
Le to bring the common law suit. Id. Maryland's system of awarding puni-
In support of its broad application of tive damages. In holding that the 
section 44, the court cited decisions award in Alexander violated due pro-
which support an employee's right to cess, the court vacated the award and 
sue his employer for "some inten- remanded for retrial the issues of 
tional torts based on the employer's whether, and in what amount, puni-
vicarious liability for the conduct of a tive damages should have been ren-
co-employee." Id. at 1073-74. The dered. 
court, however, decl ined to define the B. Dixon Evander & Associates, 
parameters of the section 44 excep- Inc. (" Evander"), an insurance bro-
tion. Id. ker, secured medical malpractice in-
The court in Federated Depart- surance for doctors at the University 
ment Stores v. Le has significantly of Maryland Hospital with an insurer, 
broadened the interpretation of sec- Mutual Fire, whose underwriter was 
tion 44 causes of action and the exclu- Shand, Morahan and Co. (" Shand" ). 
sivity exception in the Maryland Work- Shand was a subsidiary of another 
ers' Compensation Act. In so doing, broker, Alexander & Alexander (" A 
the court aligned Maryland with the & A"). Evander and Shand had a 
majority of other jurisdictions which contract whereby Evander was to be 
have similar exclusivity provisions Shand's exclusive representative for 
and exceptions in their respective professional malpractice coverage. 
Workers' Compensation Acts. Mary- In order to obtain less expensive 
land employers are now subject to malpractice coverage, the hospital se-
increased liability for injuries to their cured A & A as its new exclusive 
employees. Potential plaintiffs may broker in 1985. This decision created 
now seek a common law action against a conflict with Shand's agreement to 
their employers for the deliberate ac- underwrite exclusively for A & A. 
tions of co-employees causing non- Aware of the conflict, Shand officials 
physical injury. In this respect, more refused to place any of the hospital's 
employers may have to defend them- insurance needs with its carrier except 
selves against claims arising from situ- through Evander. At trial, it was 
ations over which they have little revealed that A & A officials had 
control. Moreover, the small busi- pressured Shand officials to accept 
ness owner who, although able to hospital policies through A & A in 
exert some control over the situation, spite of Shand's promise to Evander. 
may not have the financial means to Evander claimed that A & A had 
afford the increased litigation costs of tortiously interfered with his contract 
actions now permitted. with Shand, thereby depriving him of 
commissions from that contract. 
- Steven B. Drucker Evander additionally alleged that A & 
A had conspired to harm his business 
reputation. Testimony at trial re-
vealed that an A & A vice-president 
